Calliope (1889) - a general history

Board of Trade Wreck Report: "CALLIOPE" (S.S.). 
The Merchant Shipping Act, 1894. 
IN the matter of a formal investigation held at the Municipal Buildings, West Hartlepool, on the 7th and 8th days of December, 1900, before ROBINSON MURRAY and JACOB SHEPHERD ALLISON, Esquires, Justices of the Peace for the Borough of West Hartlepool, assisted by Captains A. Anderson and A. Wood, into the circumstances attending the stranding of the British steamship " CALLIOPE," of West Hartlepool, near Peniche, Coast of Portugal, on or about the 2nd of November, 1900. 

Report of Court. 

The Court having carefully inquired into the circumstances attending the above-mentioned shipping casualty, finds for the reasons stated in the annex hereto, that the stranding and subsequent loss of the "Calliope" was caused by the courses stated to have been set and steered not having been made good, and the neglect of the master to use the lead in thick weather when in close proximity to, and approaching, the Burlings. 

The Court finds the master, John Benjamin Kent, in default, but, in consideration of all the circumstances, does not deal with his certificate but severely censures him for the omission to use the lead, and he is censured accordingly. 

Dated this eighth day of December, 1900.

R. MURRAY, 
J. S. ALLISON, 
Justices. 
We concur in the above report.

ABSM. ANDERSON, 
A. WOOD, 
Assessors. 

Annex to the Report. 

This inquiry was held at the Municipal Buildings, West Hartlepool, on the 7th and 8th days of December, 1900, Mr. Percy Corder, solicitor, Newcastle on-Tyne, appeared for the Board of Trade, and Mr. Miller, solicitor, Liverpool, for the master. The first and second officers appeared in person but were not represented. 

The "Calliope," official number 97,367, was a British screw steam vessel, built of steel, at West Hartlepool, by Messrs. Willam Gray and Company, Limited, in 1889, and was registered at West Hartlepool. She was owned by Mr. Arthur Gladstone and others, Mr. Arthur Gladstone of Surtees Street, West Hartlepool, being designated as managing owner in the transcript of register. 

The "Calliope" was rigged as a schooner and was propelled by three compound, inverted, direct acting engines of 220 nominal horse-power combined, her full speed being about nine knots. Her dimensions were as follows: Length 314.5 feet, breadth 40.6, and depth 22 feet. Her registered tonnage, after deducting 1006.81 tons for crew space and propelling power, was 1926.7 tons. On the voyage in question she was in a good and seaworthy condition and well found in all respects. 

On the 28th October, 1899 the "Calliope" left Newport, Monmouthshire, with a cargo of 3,500 tons of coal, bound for Marseilles, under the command of Mr. John B. Kent, who holds a certificate of competency as master, number 012,180. Her draught of water on leaving was 21 feet 9 inches forward and 22 feet 1 inch aft, in fresh water. The crew consisted of 25 hands all told. All went well on the passage until after Cape Finnisterre was passed on the 1st November at 2.25 a.m. The vessel's distance from this point when abeam was found by a four point bearing to be 5 1/2 miles. The compass course, then being steered S.W. by S. 1/4 S. magnetic, was continued until about 8 a.m., at which time the course was altered to S. by W. 3/4 W. magnetic, the weather being fine and the wind very light and variable. The vessel was steered by steam steering gear on the flying bridge, where the Standard compass, by which the courses were set and steered, was also placed.
The deviation on this compass for the course steered, S. by W. 3/4 W. magnetic, was 8º E. There were deviation cards for the compasses on board the vessel but they were not used, the deviation found by observation being used instead. None of the witnesses knew when the compasses were last adjusted and these deviation cards made out. It was stated that this deviation of 8º had been found to exist by three independent observations of the sun on the 1st of November, the day immediately preceding the stranding.
About 8 a.m. on the 1st November observations were taken for finding the longitude by chronometer, the weather being then clear and the horizon well defined. The master took the altitudes and the first officer the time of each on the chronometer. The master, first officer, and second officer calculated the position of the vessel from these sights, and the position found by each was practically the same, the longitude corrected to noon being 9º 39' W., while the latitude obtained by the meridian altitude of the sun was 41º 37' N. From this position the course the vessel was being steered should have placed her, when abreast of the Burlings, about 5 miles to the westward of those rocks.
The vessel continued on this course, going at full speed, about 8 knots, until about 7.50 p.m., when, owing to a fog coming on, the engines were slowed until about 10 p.m., at which time, the weather having cleared, full speed was resumed. The master at this time went below, leaving orders with the second officer, who was in charge on the bridge, to report to him the state of the weather when he was relieved at 12 o'clock, and to tell the first mate to call him at 1.30 a.m. The master was called in accordance with this order at 1.30 a.m. on the 2nd November, and went on the flying bridge.
At about 3.15 a.m. the weather became very thick with fog and the speed of the engines was reduced to dead slow. About 3.30 a.m. the master, seeing the condition of the weather, and finding from the patent log that the vessel had run about 125 miles since noon, went into the chart room to consult the chart as to the position of the vessel, with the view of altering the course to pass St. Vincent. While in the chart room he felt the vessel run aground. The first officer was then on the flying bridge, and an apprentice was keeping a look-out from the forecastle head.
About 3.50 a.m. a peculiar noise was heard by those on the bridge and forecastle which was probably caused by the swell breaking on the shore, as immediately afterwards land appeared and the vessel was aground before any steps could be taken to prevent it. The engines were put full speed astern and kept going astern until the bearings heated, but they were unable to bring the vessel off the ground and she canted broadside on to the beach and began to make water rapidly in the hold and engine-room. The boats were got out, and at about 9 a.m. the second officer went on shore to wire for assistance. A message was received from Gibraltar in reply indicating that assistance was being sent.
Between 3 and 4 p.m. the master landed to obtain all assistance possible, leaving the second officer on board, the first officer being absent from the ship at this time landing the crew's effects. Early on the morning of the 3rd November the second mate also left the vessel, as he considered it was unsafe for him to stay on board. A salvage boat arrived during the forenoon of the 4th November, but decided from the position and condition of the " Calliope" that she could not be salved, and she was then abandoned-a total wreck.
A translation of extracts from the log kept at Cape Carvoeiro Lighthouse was handed in to the Court. These extracts stated that the fog signal was being sounded, but the Court is satisfied that these sound signals were not heard by those on board the "Calliope," and the point where she stranded was about one mile distant from Cape Carvoeiro Lighthouse. 

Regarding the non-use of the lead by the master when he supposed, and had good grounds for supposing, that he was approaching a position to the westward and abreast of the Burlings, it has to be noted that, though the soundings in that locality owing to the depth of water and formation of the sea bottom would not have definitely fixed the position of the vessel, yet the master could have ascertained from such soundings if his vessel was in actual danger. As a matter of fact had he taken a cast of the lead at any time between 3.15 a.m., when the weather became thick, and the time of stranding, due warning would have been obtained of the danger into which the "Calliope" was running, which should have prevented the loss of this valuable vessel.
The Court cannot too strongly impress upon the practical navigator the great importance of the use of the lead under' similar circumstances. Not only are soundings useful in thick weather in determining the position, but, even where the nature of the soundings do not admit of this, they are always of great value in at least indicating that the vessel is not in actual danger. The investigations of Courts of Inquiry into shipping casualties show conclusively that in almost all cases of stranding during thick weather, the use of the lead at any time within a considerable period before the casualty would have given those in charge of the navigation timely and sufficient warning of, and enabled them to avoid, the danger into which they were running. 

At the conclusion of the evidence, Mr. Corder, on behalf of the Board of Trade, submitted the following questions for the opinion of the Court:— 

1. What number of compasses had the vessel; were they in good order and sufficient for the safe navigation of the vessel; and when and by whom were they last adjusted ? 

2. Did the master ascertain the deviation of his compasses by observation from time to time; were the errors correctly ascertained and the proper corrections to the courses applied ? 

3. Were proper measures taken to ascertain and verify the position of the vessel at or about 2.25 a.m. of the 1st of November last? 

4. Was a safe and proper course set at or about 2.25 a.m. of the 1st November last, and was due and proper allowance made for the tide and current ? 

5. Was a safe and proper alteration made in the course at or about 7.45 a.m. of the 1st November last, and was due and proper allowance made for the tide and currents ? 

6. Was the position of the vessel correctly ascertained at or about noon of the 1st November last ? 

7. Having regard to the state of the weather on the morning of the 2nd November, was the vessel navigated at too great a rate of speed ? 

8. Was the lead used before the stranding, and, if not, should it have been used? 

9. Was a good and proper look-out kept ? 

10. Was the fog trumpet at Cape Carvoeiro sounded between midnight and 3.30 a.m. of the 2nd November, and was it heard by those on board the "Calliope" before she struck? 

11. What was the cause of the casualty? 

12. Was the vessel navigated with proper and seamanlike care ? 

13. Was the serious damage to the s.s. "Calliope" caused by the wrongful act or default of the master, chief and second officers, or either of them? 

Mr. Miller addressed the Court on behalf of the master, and the chief and second officers not desiring to address the Court, Mr. Corder replied on behalf of the Board of Trade. 

The Court replied to the questions as follows:— 

1. The vessel had three compasses, viz :—A Pole compass, a Standard on the upper bridge, by which the vessel was navigated and steered, and one aft. They were in good order, and sufficient for the safe navigation of the vessel. There was no evidence as to when or by whom, they were last adjusted. There were deviation cards on board, but they were not used.

2. The Master ascertained the deviation of his compasses by observations from time to time, the errors were correctly ascertained and the proper corrections to the courses applied.

3. Proper measures were taken to ascertain and verify the position of the vessel at or about 2.25 a.m. of the 1st November last, when off Cape Finisterre light. 

4. A safe and proper course was set at or about 2.25 a.m. on the 1st November last, and due and proper allowance was made for the tide and current. 

5. A safe and proper alteration was made in the course at or about 7.45 a.m. of the 1st November, and due and proper allowance was made for the tide and currents. 

6. The position of the vessel was correctly ascertained at noon of the 1st of November last, by observations which were taken and worked independently by the master, mate, and second mate, and which placed the vessel in latitude 41º 37' N. and longitude 9º 39' W. 

7. Having regard to the state of the weather on the morning of the 2nd November, the vessel was, according to the evidence, not navigated at too great a rate of speed. 

8. The lead was not used before stranding. Considering the thick state of the weather and the proximity of the vessel to the Burlings, the Court is of opinion that it should have been used, and its total neglect was a grave omission. 

9. A good and proper look-out was kept. 

10. There was no evidence as to whether the fog trumpet at Cape Carvoeiro was sounded between midnight and 5.30. a.m. of the 2nd November. The logs at the lighthouse were produced which stated that it was being sounded, but, according to the evidence, it was not heard by those on board the "Calliope." 

11. The casualty was caused by the courses stated to have been set and steered not having been made good, and the neglect of the master to use the lead in thick weather when in close proximity to, and approaching the Burlings. 

12. The vessel was not navigated with proper and seamanlike care after 3.15 a.m. of the 2nd November last. 

13. The stranding, and subsequent loss of the "Calliope" were caused by the default of the master alone. The Court finds the master in default, but in consideration of all the circumstances, the Court does not deal with his certificate, but severely censures him for the omission to use the lead, and he is censured accordingly.

R. MURRAY, 
J. S. ALLISON, 
Justices. 

We concur.

ABSM. ANDERSON, 
A. WOOD, 
Assessors. 
(Issued in London by the Board of Trade on the 8th day of January, 1901.) 

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