Stallingbro - wreck report

"STALLINGBRO" (S.S.)

IN the matter of the formal Investigation held at the Crown Court, Cardiff, on the 25th, 26th, and 27th April 1878, before H. C. ROTHERY, Esquire, Wreck Commissioner, assisted by Rear Admiral APLIN, R.N., and Captain JONES, as Assessors, into the circumstances attending the abandonment and loss of the Steam Ship "STALLINGBRO," of Newcastle, about 50 miles south-west of the Land's End, on the 30th day of March 1878, whilst on a voyage from Cardiff to Odessa with a cargo of coals.

The Court, having carefully inquired into the circumstances of the above-mentioned shipping casualty, finds, for the reasons stated in the annexed judgment, that the loss of the said ship is due to her having been too deeply laden when she left Cardiff; to the fact that her hatches were not properly secured, as they should have been, on the night of Thursday, the 28th of March last; to the want of proper measures having been taken to prevent the water getting into her; to none of the deck pumps having been shipped until after the fires had been extinguished; and to only one deck pump having been used during the night of Friday.

The Court is also of opinion that the vessel was abandoned by her master, officers, and crew too hastily.

For these wrongful acts and defaults, the Court suspends the certificates of William Barff, the master, and William Clarkson, the first mate of the said vessel, for three months from this day, and recommends that, in lieu of the master's certificates which they held, they be allowed first mate's certificates during the time of such suspension.

The Court makes no order as to costs.

Dated this 27th day of April 1878.

H. C. ROTHERY,
Wreck Commissioner.
We concur in the above report.
T. L. APLIN,
Rear Admiral,
Assessors.
HENRY JONES,

Judgment.

The Commissioner.-The "Stallingbro" was an iron screw steam ship of about 1,700 tons gross and 1,085 tons net register, and was fitted with two engines of 140 horse power. She was built at West Hartlepool, in the year 1877, and at the time of her loss was owned by a number of gentlemen, of whom Mr. James Pyman, of 74, Quay Side, Newcastle, was the managing owner.

In March 1877 she left this country for Madras, laden with a cargo of iron, and under the command of Captain William Barff, and having discharged her cargo, she proceeded to Calcutta, and, was then for some time engaged in carrying cargoes of rice from Calcutta to Madras and other ports on the east coast of India. In September, Captain Barff had to leave the vessel on account of illness, and returned to this country. What voyages she undertook after his departure, we have not been informed; but in March last she arrived at Bristol with a cargo of barley from Odessa, which she seems to have discharged in good order. There Captain Barff rejoined her on the 22nd of March; and on Saturday the 23rd he brought her to Cardiff. On Monday the 25th, she commenced to take in a cargo of coals, completed it on the 27th, and at 2.30 p.m. of the 28th she left Cardiff in charge of a pilot, and with a crew of 24 hands all told, bound to Odessa, but with instructions to call at Malta for orders.

Off Nash Point, the pilot left her, and she proceeded on her voyage, the wind blowing a strong breeze from the northward and eastward. They passed Lundy Island at about 4 a.m., and at about 8 a.m. were off the Longships, the wind apparently increasing, and she was then under her fore topsail, fore trysale, and fore staysail. When well clear of the land she began to labour a good deal, and between 10 and 11 a.m. shipped some heavy seas, one of which tore away the tarpaulin from No. 2 hatchway, and another carried away one of the forward ventilators. Attempts were made, but apparently not with much success, to replace the tarpaulin; the ventilator, however, was plugged, and the other plugs were got up ready to be used in case of need.

Finding that the vessel still continued to labour and to ship heavy seas, and that she was steering rather wildly, the master determined to heave her to; but in doing so the fore topsail blew away. The main staysail was thereupon set, and she was laid to on the port tack, with the wind still from the northward and eastward. It was now between 11 and 12 o'clock. The gale increased, and she continued to ship heavy seas forward of the bridge house, and a second ventilator rather further aft was carried away. The whole was, however, plugged; but, from some cause which has not been explained, the plug did not remain in the hole, but required a man to hold it down with a boat hook to prevent its coming out.

In the meantime, water had begun to accumulate in the stokehole, and the engine-room pumps were thereupon set to work. The water, however, continued to gain, coming in not only at No. 2 hatchway, but at the ventilator hole, by the engine-room skylight and at the stokehole grating, as well as at the hatchway of the thwartship bunker. At about 2 p.m. the pumps were choked with small coal; but they cleared them from time to time, until the water had risen so as to make it impossible for them to get at the strums, when they punched holes in the pipes to allow the water to run to the pumps; and, if we are to believe the engineers, the pumps were kept constantly working until the fires were extinguished. At about 6 p.m. the water had risen so high as to extinguish the fires; and the engine-room pumps, which up to that time were the only ones that had been at work, stopped. After this, but how soon after is open to doubt, the hand pumps were brought on deck; and one of them having been shipped, was set to work. Throughout Friday night only one pump was kept at work, and this, with some baling from the stokehole, is all that seems to have been done to keep the water under.

By daylight of Saturday, the water had gained upon them considerably, and we were told by the chief engineer that there were 10 feet in the stokehole. It was accordingly determined to abandon her, and for this purpose orders were given to get the boats out. It seems that the vessel, when she left Cardiff, had two life boats, a jolly boar, and a gig; but during Friday, the jolly boat and one of the life boats got badly stove, so as to render them useless, and there remained but one life boat and the gig. These were put over the side without delay. The second mate, the steward, the donkey man, three firemen, and two able seamen got into the gig: and the remainder of the crew, 16 in number, including the master and the mate, got into the life boat; and both boats shoved off. For about an hour they kept company, but a snow squall having then come on, they got separated, and the gig was not again seen. The life boat continued to make head against the sea, apparently not shipping any water of consequence, until 2 p.m., when they fell in with a German barque. which took them on board, and landed them at Brixhum. The master and mate told us that they saw the "Stallingbro" for about an hour after they had left her, but some of the men say that they saw her for three or four hours afterwards; but there can be but little doubt that she must have sunk soon afterwards, as she had from 10 to 13 feet water in the engine room when they left her, and the water would necessarily gain upon her when the pump ceased to work. The gig also has not since been heard of, and it may reasonably be assumed that she also went down with the 8 men who were in her.

Mr. Stephens, who appeared for the master, and Mr. Waldron, who has appeared for the Board of Trade, have both told us that this is a very extraordinary case. And so, in our opinion, it is. Here we have a fine and nearly new vessel, classed 100 A 1; and wishin 36 hours after leaving Cardiff, without any very extraordinary bad weather, the master and mate find it necessary to abandon her; and thus a valuable ship, insured, as we have been told, for 26,000l., is lost, together with her cargo of above 2,000 tons of coal. So extraordinary a circumstance requires some explanation; and that we have not received from either the master or the mate,-at all events an explanation which would show that this casualty could not have been avoided. And accordingly, after the conclusion of the evidence, the Board of Trade preferred charges against both these officers: against the master for not having taken proper measures to secure the safety of the vessel, and for having abandoned her under circumstances which did not warrant such a course; and against the mate for not remaining on deck during his watch, and for not having taken proper precautions to secure the safety of the vessel before she was finally abandoned.

Now Mr. Waldron in his opening address stated that the points to which our attention would be specially directed were the following: first, whether the vessel was in a good condition, and the cargo properly stowed; secondly, whether she had a sufficient freeboard, or whether, having regard to the time of the year, she was too deeply laden; thirdly, whether the master was justified in continuing his voyage; fourthly, whether proper measures were taken on board to insure the safety of the vessel; and, fifthly, whether they were justified in abandoning her when they did. On the answers to these questions will depend what amount of blame, in the opinion of the Court, attaches to the master and mate of this vessel.

Now it was said by Mr. Ingledew, who appeared for the owners, that no charge having been preferred against his parties in regard to the condition in which this vessel had been sent to sea, and more particularly after the evidence that had been given by Mr. Mansfield, the shipwright surveyor to the Board of Trade at this port, it would not be necessary for the Court to consider whether the vessel had or had not been sent to sea too deeply laden. But we can hardly agree with him on this point. It seems to us that, in the discharge of the duty which has been imposed upon us, to ascertain and report fully upon all the circumstances which have led to this casualty, and in justice also to the officers, we are bound to enquire whether this vessel was too deeply laden when she was sent to sea. Not indeed that it would relieve the master from the liability which would necessarily attach to him if the vessel was too deeply laden; but it might tend to explain circumstances which otherwise might be very difficult to understand.

And, first, as regards the condition of the vessel. We think that, after the evidence which has been given, there can be no question whatever that she was a thoroughly good vessel, and, so far as the owners were concerned, that she was thoroughly well fitted for the voyage for which she was designed. She had recently brought a cargo of barley from Odessa to this country, and had, we are told, delivered it in good condition; and there is no evidence whatever that her hull and machinery were not in a thoroughly good and efficient state. Nor, indeed, is there anything in the mode of stowing the cargo which would seem to call for any remarks from the Court.

Secondly, had she a sufficient freeboard, or, having regard to the time of the year, was she too deeply laden? It seems that this vessel took in at Cardiff 1,876 tons of coal as cargo, in addition to 238 tons of bunker coal, making in all 2,114 tons. We were told also by the master that, when fully laden, she drew 19 feet 6 forward and 20 feet aft, was sunk down to the level of the Plimsoll mark, and that she had a freeboard of 2 feet, so that she had a freeboard of 24 inches in a draught of about 20 feet of water, with a depth of hold of 20 feet and 2/10 ths. At first sight certainly that seems to be a very small amount of freeboard for a vessel of her build. It was said, however, that on her first voyage she had carried no less than 1,730 tons of iron, a much more dangerous cargo than coal, in addition to 364 tons of bunker coal, making altogether 2,094 tons; and that with that cargo she had safely arrived at her destination, Madras, and had there delivered her cargo. But the master, in answer to a question which I put to him, stated that he had on that occasion a remarkably fine passage, and that in fact, during the six months that he was in command of her, he never met with any really bad weather except once, and then she was light, having only some 400 tons of cargo on board.

It was also said, that although 2 feet of freeboard might seem to be small, it must not be forgotton that this vessel was fitted with a deck or bridge house in the waist, rising some 6 feet above the main deck; that just at the break of the bridge house forward the main deck would be 3 feet or 36 inches out of the water, even when she was sunk down to the Plimsoll mark amidships; and that this would offer a certain resistance to the waves, and supplement to a certain extent the low freeboard. But it must be remembered that it was precisely at this point, just forward of the break of the bridge house, where she took in most water. The mate told us that the waves curled round, and came bodily in just forward of the bridge house. When there the water would wash from end to end between the bridge house and forecastle, finding its way, as we were told by one of the crew, into the forecastle, and thence through the chain locker into the hold, and carrying away as it did the ventilators, the tarpaulin over the hatchway, and whatever else was in its way. No doubt the water would find its way out in time through the portholes on either side, but it would depend very much upon how quickly the waves followed one another on board, whether the portholes would clear the deck. According to the evidence before us, the main deck forward of the deck-house was almost constantly flooded, washing out the plug from the ventilator hole, and requiring a man to be constantly there, holding it down with a boat hook.

Now, although we are not prepared to say, after the evidence given by Mr. Mansfield, that this vessel was overladen to such an extent that the Board of Trade would have been justified in stopping her had they seen her before she left, we think that she was so deeply laden that any little increase to the weight that she had on board, whether from taking in water or from any other cause, would tend to render her position one of very considerable danger. She was, to say the least, very deeply laden. It was the old story of the camel, but on whose back the last straw had not yet been laid, not indeed until the water had got down into her hold, when she became too heavy to rise to the waves.

The third point which we were asked to consider was, whether the master was justified in continuing his voyage? As a matter of fact, however, he did not continue his voyage, but he hove his ship to; moreover, it was quite impossible for him, with the wind from northward and eastward, to return to port. Whether or not it would have been better to have set more canvas, and thus outrun the waves; may possibly be a question. It is for the master, when he is in charge of a vessel, to ascertain what course it is best to take,-whether to lie to, or to run before the sea. No doubt Captain Barff acted to the best of his judgment in heaving the ship to, and we are not disposed to blame him for having so done.

The next point to which Mr. Waldron stated that our attention ought to be directed was, whether proper measures were taken on board to insure the safety of the vessel. This resolves itself into two questions: first, were proper measures taken to prevent water getting into the hold, having regard to the fact that she was so deeply laden? and, secondly, were proper measures taken after water had got into the hold to prevent her from foundering?

And, first, as to the measures, if any, which were taken to prevent water getting down into the hold. It seems that this vessel was fitted with four hatchways-two between the bridge house and forecastle, and two abaft. Along the centre of each hatchway was laid a fore and after, with two cross pieces on each side, resting on the combings and the fore and after, and thus dividing the hatchway into six openings. In each of these openings were laid three hatches, each of which was about 4 ft. 6 long by about 2 ft. broad; so that there were 18 hatches to each hatchway, 9 on each side; and each hatch had two hand holes, or 36 hand holes in each hatchway, through which of course the water would find its way into the hold, unless securely covered with tarpaulins. Now, it seems that on leaving Cardiff the hatches were open, but as soon as they got clear of the docks the carpenter set to work to put the hatches on. He was going to put on all the hatches and to cover them over with tarpaulins, but by the mate's directions he left two hatches in each hatchway off, with the tarpaulins turned back from those places, so as to allow, as we are told, for the escape of gas during the night. Thus the hatchways were left during the whole of that night and until the following morning, when the carpenter put on the remaining hatches, covering them up with the tarpaulins.

Now it is clear that during that night the vessel shipped a good deal of water, for we are told that when off Lundy Island at about 4 o'clock that morning she met with a very bad cross sea; and whatever water came on her decks would necessarily find its way down into the hold, either through the hatches that had been left off, or through the 36 hand holes in each hatchway, the tarpaulins not having been battened down. Indeed the carpenter told us that when he went to put on the remaining hatches in the morning, he found from the state of the cargo that a great deal of water must have gone down into the hold. As he described it, there had been a shoot of water down the hatchways. And I am advised by the assessors that it was an act of great negligence on the part of the mate, a negligence which the master must share with him, to leave those hatches off during the whole of that night, considering that there was every appearance of bad weather, and that the vessel was so deeply laden. It would only have been a proper and reasonable precaution, seeing the danger that would result to the vessel in the state in which she was from getting any water into her hold, to have battened down those hatches. and securely fastened down the tarpaulins that night. And if it should be said that, if this was done, there would be no escape for the gas that might be generated, the answer is that there were the ventilators; and the assessors tell me that any danger from gas could have been easily avoided by lifting the hatches the next morning, or when the weather had moderated. In their opinion it was an act of gross negligence to leave those hatches open during the night.

Secondly, as to the tarpaulins. Now it is admitted that no one of the hatchways was covered with more than a single tarpaulin. The carpenter has told us that all the tarpaulins were old, that he called the mate's attention to it, and that the mate told him that he could not give him the new ones, as they would be wanted when the vessel had a dry cargo on board. The mate has denied that he said this. He told us that they were the only tarpaulins that they had on board, except one for No. 2 hatchway, but which was old and torn. He told us that they had been made by himself and the second mate on the voyage from Malta to Odessa, that they were the same that had covered the hatchways when she brought the cargo of barley from Odessa to Bristol, and that they were perfectly good.

Now I am advised by my assessors that, looking to the fact that this vessel, from her being so deeply laden, would in all probability take in a great quantity of water, particularly between the bridge house and the forecastle, it would have been a proper and reasonable precaution to have put double tarpaulins over the hatchways. Whether then it is true, as the carpenter has said, that the mate refused to give the new tarpaulins, or whether, according to the mate, he had only those tarpaulins on board, he is in our opinion equally to blame. This man came in the vessel from Odessa; he knew therefore, or ought to have known, what tarpaulins there were on board; and if she had only one set of tarpaulins, it was his duty to have told the master, and indeed the owners, of whom it appears that there were two on board in coming from Bristol to Cardiff; and there can be little doubt that those gentlemen, sooner than risk the safety of their vessel, would have furnished her with a second set. Whether, therefore, she had a second set of tarpaulins which the mate refused to give to the carpenter, or whether she had not, the mate is in our opinion equally to blame, and the master also must share with him the blame for not seeing that there was a sufficient number of tarpaulins on board.

But it was not only through No. 2 hatchway, from which the tarpaulin was torn off, that the water got down into the hold; it got down also through the hatchway of the thwartship bunker; for the carpenter has told us, and from the way in which he gave his evidence we have every reason to believe him, that he found it impossible to secure the after part of that tarpaulin. Water also, according to the evidence of the engineer, came down in great quantities through the engine-room skylight, it came down also through the stokehole grating, and it came down through one of the broken ventilators. Now, to prevent the water getting into the vessel at these various places, what measures did they take? Literally none at all. They might, even if they had had only one set of tarpaulins on board, have cut up some old sails to put over the hatchways; they might in the same way have secured the hatchway of the thwartship bunker; they might have put covers over the engine-room skylight, and over the stokehole gratings. But nothing of this do they seem to have done: they allow the water to get into the vessel, sinking her deeper and deeper every minute.

But if they took no proper measures to prevent the water getting into her, what measures did they take, after the water was in her, to save her from foundering? Almost none at all. They knew that the water was rising in the engine room, and that it was gaining upon the engine room pumps, and yet they never shipped any of the deck pumps until the fires had been put out. Throughout the whole of the night of Friday only one hand pump was kept at work, besides the small quantity of water that would be taken out of the stokehole by two men with buckets. The mate has admitted that four men at this hand pump would do as much as 40. Why then did they not have a second hand pump rigged so as to have had two pumps to assist in freeing the ship? and why were not those hand pumps rigged before the water had gained so much in the engine room as to extinguish the fires? The first reason which the mate gave for not rigging a second hand pump was, because the wreck of the jolly boat was in the place where the second hand pump would have had to be placed. And when asked why he had not removed the wreck of the jolly boat, he said that to do that he would have been obliged to take the men away from the other hand pump. But with a crew of 24 hands, of whom 4 only could work at the pump, is it to be supposed that they had not a sufficient number of hands to have removed the wreck of the jolly boat without taking off these 4 men from the pump which was at work? The mate then said that, even if they had removed the jolly boat, the men could not have stood there to work the pumps, as it was on the weather side of the deck. But it must be remembered that these pumps were on the top of the bridge, six feet above the main deck; and the assessors have great difficulty in believing that the men could at no time have stood there to work the pump. Had these two hand pumps been rigged whilst the engine-room pumps were still working, it is quite possible that they might have prevented the water from rising so high as to extinguish the fires; after the fires had been extinguished, the chances of saving the vessel were seriously affected.

As an excuse for not having taken more active measures to save this vessel, the master has told us that on the Friday morning he sprained his ankle, and that his foot had been afterwards seriously damaged by being jammed between the companion and one of the hen coops which was washing about the deck. He had accordingly been obliged to remain in the galley, which was on the lower bridge all Friday night, nursing his foot, that being the best place for giving orders and seeing that everything was being done to save the ship. But, according to his own showing, what orders did he give, what measures did he take, for saving the ship? None that we can find out, except ordering one deck pump to be worked, and that too only after the engine-room fires had been extinguished, and it was too late. The mate, indeed, had no such excuse as the master to offer. He was not disabled, and yet he seems to have shown the same lamentable want of resource. They seem to have accepted their fate, and to have done nothing to save the ship except to man this one pump, and to take a little from the stokehole.

The fifth and last point to which our attention was specially directed was, whether they were justified in abandoning the vessel? No doubt, if they had taken no other measures than they did, a time must have come when they must have abandoned her to save their lives. But the question is, were they justified in abandoning her as and when they did? It seems that the master had no intention of abandoning her until just at daylight of Saturday, and the instant the intention was formed steps seem to have been taken to carry that purpose into effect. Everything was done in a hurry. The boats having been put over the side, the men jumped into them, two of them in so doing falling into the water. Not a paper, not even the master's watch, was saved; and no provisions, or hardly any, and no water put into the boats. Everything seems to have been done in a panic. They seem to have lost their heads, to have shown an utter want of control, There was no order, no directing spirit; they tumble into the boats as they can, the master and mate before many of the men,-although they were in the direct track of vessels, and although, as the fact proved, there was no need for such great haste, as the vessel continued to float for some time afterwards. We are not disposed to place much reliance in the boatswain, who showed a strong animus against both the master and mate, or to believe what he told us, that they seemed to be anxious to throw away the vessel, and refused to make any signal to the vessels who were said to be in sight when they abandoned her. The idea is too preposterous that they were anxious to throw away their own lives together with the ship; but they showed an unseamanlike eagerness to abandon her when there appears to have been no immediate necessity to do so.

Now it was said that the injuries which this vessel sustained were quite insufficient to account for the water which was in her; that there was more water in her than could have got in by No. 2 hatchway, the ventilators, the engine-room skylight, and the grating over the stokehole; and that the water must have got into the vessel in some other way. And, indeed, it is a matter of some surprise that the pumps, which we were told by the engineers worked well until the fires were extinguished, should not have been able to keep the water under. Mr. Ingledew, who appeared for the owners, suggested that possibly the engineers might have left some of the cocks open, and that thus the water got into the ship; but we have no evidence of the fact, and we must, I think, reject any suggestion that it was owing to any defects in the hull that she made so large a quantity of water.

But, however this may be, the causes which, in our opinion, contributed largely if not altogether to the loss of this vessel, are the following: First, we think that she was too deeply laden for a vessel of her construction, so that even a small quantity of water in the hold would seriously affect her powers of flotation, and prevent her rising to the sea; and in that case every wave which broke over her would tend to sink her deeper. Secondly, we think that the fact that the hatches were not properly secured on the Thursday night, and that proper measures were not taken to prevent the water getting into the hold, materially contributed to the casualty. Thirdly, we think that the neglect to bring any of the hand pumps into use until after the fires had been extinguished, or to take any measures to save her from sinking, placed the vessel in a much greater position of danger. For all these acts of neglect we think that the master and mate are greatly to blame. They had a fine ship under their command; but, from want of care, from want of energy and of those seamanlike qualities which were to be expected of men placed in command of such a vessel, they allowed her to sink; and we think that we should not be doing our duty if we did not mark the sense that we feel of their misconduct by suspending their certificates.

No charge has been made against either the master or the mate of drunkenness. The only person accused of drunkenness is the second officer, but he is not here to answer for himself. Had there been any such charge against these men, and had it been proved, our sentence would have been much more severe than it will be. We think that we must mark our sense of their neglect and misconduct in allowing so valuable a vessel to be lost without taking proper steps to prevent it, by suspending their certificates for three months. Both the master and the mate now hold master's certificates, which it seems were lost with the ship, and we shall recommend that instead of those certificates being renewed they should be allowed first mate's certificates. (To Mr. Waldron.) Do you ask for costs?

Mr. Waldron.-No. sir.
H. C. ROTHERY,
Wreck Commissioner.

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