Linhope

"LINHOPE" (S.S.)

IN the matter of the formal Investigation held at Newcastle-on-Tyne, on the 15th, 16th, 17th, and 18th days of July 1884, before H. C. ROTHERY, Esquire, Wreck Commissioner, assisted by Captain METHVEN, Rear-Admiral PICKARD, and Captain COMYN, as Assessors, into the circumstances attending the foundering of the steamship "LINHOPE," of Newcastle, and the loss of the lives of three of her crew, on the 2nd of June last,

Report of Court.

The Court, having carefully inquired into the circumstances of the abovementioned shipping casualty, finds, for the reasons annexed, that, when the said vessel left the Tyne on her last voyage, she was overladen, unstable as laden, and insufficiently manned; that her loss is due to her being so overladen and unstable; and that Ralph Chapman, of Maritime Buildings, Newcastle-on-Tyne, the managing owner, is responsible for having sent her, and John Ruthen, the master, for having taken her to sea in that condition.

The Court is not asked to deal with the certificate of the said John Ruthen, and, for the reasons stated in the annex, it does not condemn the said Ralph Chapman in costs.

Dated this 18th day of July 1884.

(Signed)
H. C. ROTHERY,
Wreck Commissioner.
We concur in the above report.
R. METEVEN,
BENJ. S. PICKARD,
D. R. COMYN,
Assessors.

Annex to the Report.

This case was heard at Newcastle on the 15th, 16th, 17th, and 18th days of July instant, when Mr. Mansel Jones appeared for the Board of Trade, Mr. Roche for the registered owners, and Mr. Forster for the master and officers of the" Linhope," Twenty witnesses having been produced by the Board of Trade and examined, Mr. Mansel Jones handed in a statement of the questions upon which the Board of Trade desired the opinion of the Court. Mr. Roche and Mr. Forster then addressed the Court on behalf of their respective parties, and Mr. Mansel Jones having been heard in reply, the Court proceeded to give judgment on the questions upon which its opinion had been asked. The circumstances of the case are as follow:

The "Linhope" was an iron screw steamship belonging to the port of Newcastle, of 2319 tons gross, and 509 tons net register, and was fitted with engines of 250 horse power. She was built at West Hartlepool in the year 1878, and at the time of her loss was the Property of Mr. Ralph Chapman of Maritime Buildings, Newcasle-on-Tyne, and others, Mr. Ralph Chapman being the managing owner. She left Newcastle for Port Said on the 29th of May last, with a crew of 24 hands all told, and a cargo of 2543 tons 8 cwt. of coals, besides 616 tons 15 cwt. in her bunkers, and at noon of the 1st of June following passed Ushant. On the following day there was a fresh breeze from the N.W. to N.N.W., and she was then observed to have a slight list to port, upon which chains and other heavy articles were carried over to the starboard side with the view of righting her; and the fore and main staysails and the fore trysail having been set to steady her, the engineers were ordered to work the coals out of the port bunkers. There is some question as to the extent to which the list increased during the afternoon and early part of the evening, but between half-past ten and eleven o'clock she suddenly took a very heavy list to port, putting the lee rail under water. The second officer, who was on the bridge, immediately went to the chart room to arouse the master, who, on coming on deck, at once ordered the engines to be stopped, the sails to be taken in, and the helm to be put hard-aport, which brought the vessel up with her head to the N.W., upon which the helm was steadied, and the engines were then put at half speed. In the meantime the vessel continued to go over until she lay over on her beam ends, and water coming down the port ventilators put out the four lower fires. Finding that she still lay over on her broadside, the master ordered the masts to be cut away, and the shrouds on the starboard side having been cut, the foremast went overboard, but the main mast remained standing. By this time the three boats on the port side had been carried away, and as the vessel still continued to lay over on her port side, and was fast filling, the master ordered the starboard lifeboat to be got out, and on this being done all hands, with the exception of the 2nd engineer and two firemen, got into her, and they had hardly pushed off before the vessel foundered. They remained about the spot but could see nothing of the three hands that had been left on board, and on the following morning were picked up by the "St. Helier" of Swansea, and were taken to and landed at Bilbao, whence they have been sent to this country.

These being the facts of the case, the Board of Trade have put to us the following questions:—

1. Whether the owners of the "Linhope" were justified in neglecting to have any calculations made as to her stability?

2. Whether the managing owner conveyed any information to the master upon this point, and whether he gave him any instructions as to the loading and stowage of her cargoes, and if not, whether he was justified in neglecting to do so?

3. Whether, having regard to the behaviour of the vessel upon the voyage from Revel to London, and from the Tyne to Bombay, the master was justified in neglecting to give instructions with reference to the stowage of her last cargo?

4. Whether, having regard to the form and dimensions of the vessel, she had, as laden, sufficient stability when leaving the Tyne on her last voyage, and whether she had sufficient freeboard or was overladen?

5. Whether her cargo was properly stowed and trimmed?

6, Whether she was properly and sufficiently manned?

7. Whether the vessel took a list upon the morning of the 2nd of June, and whether the list increased during the day; whether proper and sufficient measures were taken from time to time during the day to ascertain whether it did increase, and if so, to counteract it?

8. What was the cause of the loss of the vessel, and what the cause of the loss of life, and whether every possible effort was made to save it?

9. Whether the vessel was navigated with proper and seamanlike care?

10, Whether the master and officers are or either of them is in default, and whether blame attaches to the managing owner or any other person?

In these questions, however, the subjects of stability, freeboard, and overloading, are so mixed up together, that, if I were to attempt to answer them in the order in which they have been laid before us, it would be extremely difficult for us to express clearly the opinion which we entertain on this case. But in dealing with the case I will endeavour to answer all the questions that have been put to us.

And first let me say that there appears to be no doubt that she was a good, strong, substantial vessel. She was built in the year 1878 by Messrs. W. Gray & Co., of West Hartlepool, under special survey, and was classed 100 A 1 at Lloyd's, and from that time appears to have been well maintained, having been surveyed by Lloyd's only in May last, shortly before she left upon her last voyage. There can therefore be no doubt as to the substantial character of the vessel herself.

And now, what cargo had she on board when she went to sea on her last voyage, and was she or was she not overladen? We are told that she had 2,543 tons 8 cwt. of coal as cargo, besides 616 tons 15 cwt. in her bunkers, making a total of 3,160 tons 3 cwt., in addition to ten tons left over from her previous voyage. This would give us nearly 48 per cent. above her under deck tonnage of 2,143 tons, a tolerably large cargo for such a vessel. And now, what was her draught, what her freeboard, with this dead weight on board a According to the chief officer, she drew, when hauled out from the Staiths, 23 feet 7 inches forward, and 22 feet 5 inches aft, which would give her a mean of 23 feet. Some doubt, however, was thrown upon the accuracy of these figures by the fact that there had been an alteration made in the log book, the original entry being 23 feet 9 inches forward, and 22 feet 7 inches aft, giving her a mean of 23 feet 2 inches. The officer endeavoured to account for the alteration by saying that when he first took the draught he was standing on the Staithes, and that it was only afterwards, when he went alongside her in a boat, that he ascertained her correct draft, but that he had then made the entry in the log-book, and accordingly had to alter it. Now, Mr. Jones, the manager for Messrs. W. Gray and Co., has told us that the vessel's total depth at side was 28 feet 3 inches, which would give us a freeboard of 5 feet 3 inches if her mean draught was 23 feet, and of 5 feet 1, if the mean draught was 23 feet 2 inches. We were told also by the master, Captain Ruthen, that when the vessel was lying in the river off the Staithes, the water was lippering over the bottom of the load line, and as there seems to be no doubt that the load line had been originally placed, and always afterwards remained at 5 feet, that would give us a freeboard of 5 feet 1 to 5 feet 2 inches. I think, therefore, that we may take it that her freeboard as she lay in the river off the Staithes was from 5 feet 1 inch to 5 feet 3 inches. But it was said that she would rise about 2 inches on getting into salt water; let us see how this would be. From the tables published by Lloyd's, we find that the density of the water off the Commissioner's Staithes is said to be 1023 at high water, and 1018 at low water; let us take it at a mean of say 1020, and as fresh water is equal to 1000, whilst salt is 1025, that would give the water off the Staithes to be 4/5ths salt, and only 1/5th fresh. And as the rise of a vessel with a moulded depth of 27 feet 1 inch, which is what this vessel we are told had, would, in passing from fresh into salt water, be about 5 inches, this vessel would on getting out to sea rise about 1/5th of that, or about 1 inch from what she drew when off the Staithes. The owner also claimed 2 inches more on the principle that she would rise that much when she got deeper water under her bottom. This principle of hydrostatics that a vessel's draft varies, not with the amount of her displacement, but with the depth of the water under her keel, is one with which the Court is not acquainted, and to which without some better evidence it is not disposed to give its adhesion. We may take it, therefore, that the freeboard which this vessel would have when she cleared from the river, would be from 5 feet 2 inches to 5 feet 4 inches at the outside. Let us see whether this would or would not be sufficient freeboard for her.

And, first, I will take the Board of Trade rules. By these rules a first class iron steam vessel 300 feet long ought to have a minimum freeboard of 2.6 inches for every foot depth of hold, and as the depth of this vessel hold was 25 feet 2, that would give us a freeboard of 5 feet 5 1/2 inches. To this, however, there must be a slight correction applied, owing to the deficiency of camber, which we were told by Mr. Jones was only 6 inches, whereas by the Board of Trade rules it should have been a quarter of an inch for every foot of beam, and as the beam was 36 feet odd, that would give us a camber of 9 inches. The difference of 3 inches or 25 of a foot ought therefore, according to the rules, to be added to the registered depth, before applying the factor. This would make the registered depth 25.45, and multiplying that by the factor of 2.6, gives us a freeboard of about 5 feet 6 inches. Again, Mr. Jones, the manager for Messrs. W. Gray and Co., told us that her shear was deficient, being 6 feet forward and 1 foot 8 aft, or a mean of 3 feet 10 inches, or 46 inches, whereas by the Board of Trade rules it should have been at the rate of 20 inches to every 100 feet of length, or a total of 60 inches, a difference of about 14 inches. Artic 10, however, of the Board of Trade rules, says that "no " addition need be made to the freeboard for deficiency " of sheer, provided that there are suitable erections " at the ends of the vessel, such as a topgallant fore- " castle, or poop, or whale backs;" and as this vessel had both a short poop and a topgallant forecastle no addition would have to be made to the freeboard for deficiency of sheer, and on the other hand no deduction from the freeboard for the deck erections, they having been already allowed for in the sheer. One inch, however, would have to be allowed under the 20th article of the rules for extra height of coamings, the coamings of the hatches being 2 feet 6 inches and 2 feet 8 inches high. This then would leave a minimum free. board as required by the Board of Trade rules for this vessel of 5 feet 5 inches.

And now let us see what freeboard she ought to have had by Lloyd's rules. Taking first the elements given to us by Mr. Jones, the manager of Messrs. W. Gray and Co., who said that she had a moulded depth of 27 feet 1 inch, we obtain by Table A a freeboard of 5 feet 11 inches. Her sheer, he told us, was 46 inches, and as Lloyd's rules require 15 inches for every 100 feet of length, that would be about right. On the other hand her camber, he said, was only 6 inches, whereas by Lloyd's rules it should have been 9, being a deficiency of 3 inches, and this divided by 2 gives one and a half inches to be added to the freeboard, making the freeboard 6 feet and half an inch. From this, however, some deduction would have to be made for the deck erections, consisting of a forecastle 35 feet long, a poop 36 feet long, and a bridge house 21 feet long. For the bridge house, Mr. Jones told us that no allowances could be made, it being open at the after end; and there remains therefore the poop and forecastle, together 71 feet, out of a total of 300 feet, for which, say, an allowance of one inch and a half might be made, leaving 5 feet 11 inches as the freeboard required by Lloyd's rules. Mr. Mills, the principal officer of the Board of Trade for the N.E. district, arrived at very much the same conclusion, but in a somewhat different way. According to Mr. Mills, the moulded depth of this vessel was not 27 feet 1, but 26 feet 8 1/2 inches, which by Table A would give a freeboard of 5 feet 9 1/2 inches. The sheer, he said, and quite rightly, ought, according to Lloyd's rules, to be measured, not at the side of the vessel, but along the centre line, and there, he said, it was only 34 1/2 inches instead of 45, which is required by the rules, a difference of 10 1/2 inches, one fourth of which would be about 2 1/2 inches to be added to freeboard. The difference also in camber being 3 inches, half of this would have to be added, making a total of 6 feet 1 1/2 inches. But from this there would have to be a deduction of say 1 1/2 or 2 1/2 inches for the deck erections, leaving 5 feet 11 inches to 6 feet as the minimum freeboard required by Lloyd's rules.

Now the minimum freeboard required by the Board of Trade rules being 5 feet 5 inches, and that required by Lloyd's rules, 5 feet 11 inches to 6 feet, it follows that 5 feet 2 inches and even 5 feet 4 inches, which is the utmost at which we could put the freeboard of the vessel when she had cleared the Tyne, would not be sufficient. That this, too, was so especially in the case of this vessel will more clearly appear when we come to deal with the question of her stability.

But we were told by Mr. Jones that with a freeboard of only 5 feet the vessel would have 34 per cent. of spare buoyancy; and as with a moulded depth of 27 feet Lloyd's rules required only a spare buoyancy of 29.3, we were asked to conclude that, even with 5 feet freeboard, she would have had a snfficient amount of spare buoyancy. But Mr. Jones was compelled, in answer to questions put to him by the Court, to admit that his socalled percentage of spare buoyancy was the proportion which the unimmersed part of the vessel bore, not to the total capacity, but to the immersed portion, which not spare buoyancy at all. If we were to estimate the spare buoyancy upon the principle that Mr. Jones has adopted, then a vessel of which two-thirds was out of the water and only one-third immersed would have a spare bnoyancy of 200 per cent., which is obviously absurd, and this Mr. Jones was obliged to admit The Court thereupon requested Mr. Jones to give the figures upon which he had founded his estimate of the spare buoyancy of the vessel, and he then said that her total capacity was 233,329 cubic feet, and the capacity of the unimmersed portion 59,029 feet, which would give a spare buoyancy of only 25 per cent., a very different thing from the 34 per cent. which he at first alleged, and from the 29.3 per cent. required by Lloyd's rules. This, I may observe, is one of the ways in which experts sometimes seek to impose upon the credulity of the Court by representing as spare buoyancy that which is no spare buoyancy at all. It is a plan which has often been attempted to be practised upon this Court, but I am happy to say without much success, owing to the assistance which it has in these cases.

The next question then, which we propose to consider is, whether the cargo was properly stowed and trimmed, and on this point we can have no doubt. The vessel it seems had four holds, two forward of and two abaft the engine room. According to the trimmers, all the lower holds were quite full; but in No. 1 'tween decks there was an empty space capable of containing about 50 tons. No. 2 'tween decks was quite full; in No. 3 there was room for about 10 tons in the fore part of it, close against the engine-room bulkhead, and in No. 4 there was an empty space capable of containing about 50 tons in the after part of it. This evidence agrees substantially with that given by the mates, and particularly with that of the second mate, who had more especially to do with the loading of the ship. All these witnesses told us that the cargo was well and properly stowed and trimmed, Mr. Donkin, the chief officer, and Mr. Foy, the second officer, stating that they gave very special attention to the trimming, and impressed upon the trimmers the necessity of stowing the cargo carefully, and for a reason, which is very suggestive, because they knew that she was a tender vessel. I may add that there were trimming hatches in the wings, which would greatly facilitate the proper stowing and trimming of the cargo. Against this there is not a particle of evidence, and we can therefore have no doubt that the cargo was properly stowed and trimmed.

I come now to the most important question in this case, namely, "Whether the vessel had or had not suffi- " cient stability, when she left the Tyne?" From the copy of the register, we see that her hold was 25.2 feet deep as against a beam of 36.3 feet, so that the depth was about 70 per cent. of the beam, a very high ratio, and although the proportions may not have been unusual at the time when this vessel was built, yet in Mr. Jones' opinion, the manager to the builders, it was higher than would be allowed at the present time, a depth of hold of 25.2 feet requiring in his opinion a beam of from 37 to 38 feet. Mr. Mills also, the principal officer of the Board of Trade for the North-east district, told us that the beam should be at least half as much again as the depth, which with a depth of 25.2 feet would give a beam of 37.8 feet. I should add that she had three ballast tanks in her bottom, No. 1 being capable of containing 87 tons, No. 2 containing 97 tons, and No. 3 containing 226 tons, or a total of 410 tons; they varied in height from four feet forward to five feet six aft, and by thus raising the cargo would, when they were empty, as they were on this voyage, tend very considerably to diminish the vessel's stability. The mere fact, however, of the undue proportion between the depth and breadth of this vessel would not, as Mr. Mansel Jones has contended, be conclusive proof of her want of stability, for she might have had weights in her bottom, which by lowering the centre of gravity would increase the metacentric height, and thus add to her stability. But in the present case we are fortunately not left wholly to conjecture as to whether this was a stable or a tender ship, for we have had before us a number of officers who have served on board her at different times, and who have given us most important evidence as to her behaviour on former voyages. First then there is Mr. William Ironside, who served in her as second officer from July to November 1881, and as chief officer from November 1881 to September 1883. According to this gentleman the vessel did not behave well with a beam sea, nor would she run from the quantity of water she took in on both sides. He said that she required very careful handling (we all understand what that means), and that a weather sea would make her roll considerably; head to sea he said was her best point, but she was a crank and tender vessel. He added indeed that during the time he was in her she never had a list, but we shall presently see what the reason of that was. The next witness is Captain Halder, who took charge of her on the first of September 1883, when Mr. Ironside left her, and who commanded her on the voyage out to New Orleans. He told us that on the voyage out she took a list, and arrived at New Orleans with it; that on leaving New Orleans she had a list, and that that list increased on the voyage home, so much so that although he was bound north about, and intended to put into the Tyne for coal, he deemed it expedient, finding that he had a beam sea, to run for the English Channel, fearing that if he held on she would go over. On his arrival in the Tyne, he at the owners' request gave up the command of the vessel to an old servant of their's for the purpose of taking her on to Revel, her port of destination. According to Captain Halder, and he in our opinion gave his evidence in a very clear and straightforward way, she was a tender ship, and with a general cargo would require, he said, great care, the centre of gravity being high. On the way to Revel the master, who had superseded Captain Halder, was killed accidentally, and therefore Captain Ruthen was sent out to Revel to take charge of her, and he remained in charge of her until she was lost. I shall have occasion presently to refer to his evidence. Then we have the evidence of Mr. Oxley, chief engineer. who joined her at the same time as Captain Halder did, in September 1883, and who remained with her until she was lost. He spoke to the list which she had on her way out, and to the list which she had coming home. He told us of the heavy list which she had on her return from Revel to London, and the list which she got on the Bombay vovage; according to him she was a very tender crank vessel. Then we have Mr. Warner, the Board of Trade surveyor, who examined the vessel in December 1883, on her arrival in London from Revel, and he described the serious list which this vessel then had, her gunwale on the port side being one foot two inches out of the water, whilst that on the starboard side was 12 feet 2 inches, a difference of 11 feet, and he told as that it was a marvel she had not gone over them. Then there was Mr. Donkin, who joined her as chief officer on the 24th January 1884, and who remained with her until she foundered. He told us that he knew her to be a tender and crank ship, and that it was on that account that he directed the trimmers to be careful in stowing and trimming the cargo. Then we have Mr. Foy, who joined her as second officer on the 28th of January, and who remained with her until she foundered; and in his opinion also she was a tender ship. Lastly, there are the trimmers, who said that they knew her well, having trimmed her several times before, and they told us that she was anything but an easy ship to trim, one of the worst they ever had. She was always falling over to one side or the other; a very little weight on one side would tend, they said, to heel her over. Now against this what evidence have we? Literally none. First, there is the evidence of Captain Ruthen, who said that in his opinion she was a safe ship with a coal cargo, but at the same time he admitted that she required careful handling, and that on that account he gave special directions to the trimmers to be very careful how they trimmed her; this was tantamount to an admission that the vessel was tender. Then there is Mr. Morris, who served in her from 1879 to 1881, with a break between, during which time he made eight voyages in her, the four first as second officer, and the four last as ehief officer. According to him, she was a stiff vessel, but it may be well to see how it was that, whilst he was in her, she was a stiff vessel, and the reason appears to us obvious. He told us that, whilst he was chief officer, he took care that she should never be laden beyond 22 feet 8 mean, whereas on the last voyage she had a mean draught of 23, if not of 23 feet 2 inches, a difference of from 4 to 6 inches. Now it must be remembered that the additional quantity of coal required to sink her these 4 to 6 inches would be placed right at the top, which would of course raise considerably the position of the centre of gravity, and at the same time diminish the metacentrio height; and this is in our opinion sufficient to account for her instability on her later voyages. With 22 feet 8 inches the vessel might be, and no doubt was, a good stable ship, but with 23 feet or 23 feet 2 inches she was an unsafe and unstable vessel. It was said, however, that on the voyage immediately preceding, the vessel had had as large a cargo of coal, indeed some 10 tons more than she had on this voyage, and that she encountered in the Bay of Biscay a very severe gale; but on that occasion she was no doubt handled differently, her head being put to the sea, which Mr. Ironside said was her best point, instead of being kept as she was heading to the southward with the sea on her beam, and some of her sails set, all tending to heel over to port. In our opinion the evidence is conclusive that as laden she was an unstable vessel.

The next question with which we propose to deal, is that of manning. it seems that the vessel's usual complement was 29 to 30 hands all told, rising on exceptional occasions to 31, and even I think on one occasion to 33, but never being under 29. It consisted of a master, two mates, a boatswain, a carpenter, eight A.B.'s, an ordinary seaman, three engineers, a donkeyman, eight or nine firemen and trimmers, and three stewards and cooks. On the voyage to Revel she had 29 hands, and on the Bombay voyage, when she was commanded by Captain Ruthen, she had 30 hands. Before, however, starting on her last voyage, Mr. Chapman, the managing owner, deputed his son, a young gentleman 22 years of age, a clerk in his office, to arrange with Captain Ruthen what crew the vessel should have. Mr. Chapman told us that he knew nothing about shipping matters, or what was a proper crew for this vessel, and young Mr. Chapman certainly knew as little, and Captain Ruthen stated that he did not advise any reduction of the crew; and yet somehow or other it was arranged that she left with only 24 hands instead of 29 or 30; and they consisted of a master, two mates, six A.B.'s, one ordinary seaman, three engineers, a donkey man, eight trimmers and firemen, and two stewards and cooks; the reduction, it is important to observe, being of some of the most effective of the deck hands, namely the carpenter, the boatswain, and two A.B.'s. In the opinion of the Assessors this vessel, when she left on her last voyage, was very greatly undermanned.

I will next deal with what in the list of questions that have been given in is marked 7, and it is this, "Whether the vessel took a list on the morning of " the 2nd of June, and whether the list increased " during the day, and whether proper and sufficient " measures were taken from time to time during the " day to ascertain that it did increase, and if so to " counteract it?" There is some discrepancy between the witnesses as to the extent of the list, which she had in the afternoon and in the early part of the evening, the master saying that it increased but very little, the chief engineer on the other hand telling us that it was very considerable. Some of the witnesses spoke of the list as having been about 2°, as if 2° would be perceptible on a vessel with a beam of 36 feet, and with her fore and main staysails and fore trysail set; but it is clear that they did not know what they were talking about, for one of them said that he thought that 2° was the same as 2 points, and that there were 18° in a right angle. On the whole, however, the fair result of the evidence would seem to be that at first the list was slight, but that it increased during the evening but only to a comparatively small extent, until between 1/2 past 10 and 11, when she suddenly fell over on to her broadside.

The next question is, "What was the cause of the loss " of the vessel?" The cause of the loss of the vessel is in our opinion quite clear. The vessel being very deeply laden, and with very little stability, owing to her small metacentric height, was kept heading to the southward with the wind and sea on her starboard beam, causing the cargo and bunker coal to settle gradually over to port, until at length she had passed the point of maximum stability, when she got a lurch to port, from which it would be impossible for her to recover, and in going over she would necessarily shift the cargo. That in our opinion was the cause of her loss.

The next question is "What was the cause of the loss " of life, and whether every possible effort was made " to save the men?" It seems that the second and third engineers occupied a cabin on the port side of the midship house, and were turned in, when the vessel fell over on her port side. Finding the water coming into the cabin, the third engineer turned out at once, and escaped by getting up through an opening at the side of the fiddley house; but the second engineer, who had been longer in the ship, and who seems to have been more accustomed to find the water coming in on the lee side, did not immediately turn out, and when he did attempt to do so, he found that it was too late, and was no doubt drowned in his cabin. The two firemen who were drowned, were also turned in when the vessel heeled over, and their bunks being on the port side, they were probably drowned before they had time to escape. Nothing that the master and crew could have done would have saved these unfortunate persons, and in our opinion no blame attaches to any of them for the loss of these lives.

The next question is "Whether the vessel was navi- " gated with proper and seamanlike care" To keep a tender vessel, laden as this one was, on her course with her side exposed to the wind and sea, and with some of her sails set, was not a very seamanlike act; and under the circumstances it would have been more prudent to have put her head to wind and sea, which was her best point. But the wind seems to have been only a fresh breeze, and the sea only moderate, and if he could not hold his course under those circumstances it might be doubtful when he would reach his journey's end. There is therefore some excuse for the master holding on, and certainly after she fell over he did all in his power to save her.

The next questions which we are asked are "Whether " the master and officers, or either of them were in " default?" and "whether blame attaches to the " managing owner, or to any other person?" As regards the officers, no blame seems to attach to them but the case is different as regards the master. Here is a vessel which he had commanded for some months, having brought her from Revel to London, and then taken her out to Bombay and back again, and of whose qualities he had therefore had ample means of informing himself, and yet he takes her to sea overladen, unstable and undermanned; and for this the Act of Parliament says that the master shall be held to blame. When the questions were at first tendered there was a clause at the end that "If the Court find John Ruthen, the " master, William Donkin, the chief mate, and William " Foy, second mate, or either of them is in default, his " certificate or certificates should in the opinion of the " Board of Trade be dealt with." I pointed out that that was not a compliance with the 16th Article of the Rules of 1878, which says that on the completion of the examination of the witnesses, "the Board of Trade shall " state in open Court, upon what questions in reference " to the cases of casualty, and the conduct of any person " connected therewith, they desire the opinion of the " Court; and if any person whose conduct is in question " is a certificated officer, they shall also state in open " Court whether in their opinion his certificate shall be " dealt with," the object of the rule being to comply with the provisions of the Act, which requires that before an officer's certificate is dealt with, he shall have full notice of the charges against him, so as to have an opportunity of making his defence. On this the clause was struck out. I am not required to say what the Court would have done had it been asked to deal with this master's certificate, for I have always held that unless the Board of Trade ask for it, the Court has no power to deal with the certificate.

And now as regards the owners. It seems that the vessel was originally built for Messrs. Henderson, and that Mr. Thomas Henderson, of Middle Dock, South Shields, was appointed the managing owner by letter dated the 4th September 1878, under the hand of George Edward Henderson, who was then the registered owner of 56 shares. On the death of Mr. Thomas Henderson, Mr. George Edward Henderson was appointed the managing owner, by letter dated the 15th of June 1881, under his own hand, he being still the registered owner of 56 shares. In the beginning of 1883, Mr. Henderson sold the greater part of his interest in the vessel, retaining only ten shares, and from that time the vessel seems to have been managed by the firm of Chapman and Miller, of which Mr. Ralph Chapman seems to be the principal partner; but it was not until the 31st of January 1884 that Mr. Ralph Chapman was appointed managing owner, although practically his firm had had the management of her since the beginning of 1883. Both Mr. George Edward Henderson and Mr. Ralph Chapman ought, therefore, to have known, if they did not know, something about this vessel, of her character and properties, and of the extent to which it would be safe to load her. They have, however, told us that they are not practical men, and not acquainted with the management of ships; but if an owner chooses to take upon himself the duties of a shipowner, he must take the onus cum dignitate; if he wishes to obtain the profits resulting from shipowning, he must perform the duties of a shipowner, and amongst those duties, one of the most important is, that he shall see that the vessel is not sent to sea in an unseaworthy condition. In this case Mr. Chapman might, if he had chosen, have learnt all about this vessel, her behaviour on her previous voyages, her tender character, more especially when she was so deeply laden. He might have known that to reduce a crew from her usual complement of 29 or 30 hands to only 24, the reduction being mainly from amongst the most effective of the deck hands, was not a way to insure the safe navigation of the vessel. And it appears to us that great blame attaches to the managing owner in this case for the way in which this vessel was sent to sea.

One other question must also be answered before I conclude. We have been asked "Whether or not the " owners were justified in neglecting to have calcula- " tions made as to her stability?" Mr. Roche has complained that no calculations have been laid before us to shew the vessel's stability, and the complaint is no doubt to a certain extent well founded. But, I would ask, whose duty was it to make these calculations? Mr. Roche says that it was the duty of the Board of Trade, but in our opinion it was the duty of the owners. What power had the Board of Trade, and what obligation was there upon them, to have this vessel inclined in order to ascertain her stability? On the other hand, it was the duty of the owners to see that this vessel went to sea in a seaworthy condition, and with such repeated warnings before them of her behaviour on former voyages, they ought to have taken every means in their power to ascertain how and to what depth she could be safely laden. Mr. Mansel Jones has referred us to the cases of the "Kensington," the "Marlborough," the "Rathmore," the "Emblehope," the "Lufra," and a number of other vessels, in which this Court has expressed itself very strongly on this point. In one of these cases, the "Emblehope," I think, the Messrs. Henderson were the owners, and there the Court called their especial attention to the undue proportions of depth to beam, and that it was probably to her instability that the loss of the vessel was due ; and this vessel, the "Linhope," is not unlike her. Nor must I omit to state that the owner's attention was specially called to the freeboard of this vessel in a letter from Mr. Mills dated the 29th of January last, and which is in these words:
"Linhope."

76,242.

Newcastle.

"SIR,

" I have received a report from one of the surveyors in this district to the effect that your steam- ship named above is loaded to a depth which gives or will give in salt water a freeboard of five feet two inches at the disc, and 5 feet 2 inches at the lowest exposed part of the deck.

Before taking any steps I should be glad if you"will inform me whether you agree with the measurements given above, and whether, after full consideration, you are decided to adhere to the freeboard mentioned above.

Dated this 29th day of January 1884.

L. MILLS,

Principal Officer
N.E. District of England.

To Messrs. The Middle Dock Co.,
 Shipowners, Newcastle."

To this letter Mr. Chapman replied on the 31st of the same month as follows:

 Maritime Buildings, Quay Side,
Newcastle-on-Tyne, 31st January 1884.
L. Mills, Esq., North Shields.
SS. 'Linhope.

 Dear Sir,

We have your printed letter of the 29th instant,  addressed to the Middle Dock Co., and beg to say in  reply that we wish to load this ship safely, and if it can be shewn that 5 ft. 3 is too little, we will have pleasure in giving instructions to load her more " lightly. We are extremely anxious to meet the views of the Board of Trade, and from our calculations she has the freeboard usually allowed by Lloyds, and the freeboard allowed by the Board of Trade rules, with slight allowances for extra strength, deck erections, &c.

Yours truly,
CHAPMAN & MILLER.

 F. W. Chapman.

Linhope, according to our observation, when free  from ashes on deck and firebars and a little bilge water, and in salt water, had a freeboard of 5 feet  4 inches.

The vessel, it seems, had left for Bombay before Mr. Chapman's letter was received, but although his attention had been thus pointedly called to the freeboard, he allows her to leave again without making any inquiry as to whether it was or was not a proper freeboard, and without any calculations as to her stability.

Before concluding this inquiry I must call attention to the course taken both by Mr. Chapman and by Mr. George Edward Henderson in refusing to answer questions put to them by the learned counsel for the Board of Trade as to what they had given for the vessel, what was she worth at the time of her loss, and for what amounts the vessel, the outfit, and the freight were insured? In fact they refused in the most persistent way to give any information at all upon the subject, on the ground that, in their opinion, it had nothing whatever to do with the case; but if ever there was a case in which the questions of the value of the vessel and the amounts for which she was insured were important it is this, and the responsibility for our not being able to say what her value was, or for what amount she was insured, must rest with Mr. Chapman and Mr. Henderson.

Mr. Mansell Jones asked that Mr. Chapman should be condemned in the costs; but it appears to me that the condemnation of an owner in the sum of 100l. or 200l. is a very inadequate punishment for having sent a ship to sea overladen, unstable, and undermanned, and it has, therefore, not been the practice of the Court, at all events recently, to condemn the owners in these cases in costs. The cases in which I should be disposed to condemn the parties in costs are those in which it appeared they had by the course they had taken increased materially the expense of the inquiry; but that has not been done in this case. I shall, therefore, not condemn Mr. Chapman in costs.