Penarth

Wreck Report 12 April 1894:

‘This was an inquiry into the circumstances attending the stranding & loss of the British steamship Penarth on the coast of Turkey, in the Black Sea, at about 10 or 12 miles west of the entrance to the Bosphorus, on the 19th February 1894, & held at the Town Hall, Cardiff, before T W Lewis Esquire.
Mr Waldron appeared for the Board of Trade, & Mr Ivor Vachell represented the master, Mr Henry Holt.
The Penarth, official number 98,432, was a British steam vessel built at West Hartlepool in 1893, by Messrs W Gray & Co., Limited, & registered at the Port of Cardiff, No. 6/1893. She was owned by Messrs Morel & Co., Limited, of 2, Stuart Street, Cardiff, Mr Philip Morel, of Marine Parade, Penarth, being the managing owner, & appointed as such on the 5th June 1893.
The Penarth was built of steel, schooner-rigged, her length being 325.5 ft.; breadth, 42.6 ft.; & depth of hold 23.96 ft.
Her gross tonnage was 3,107.33 tons, & her registered tonnage 2,016.39 tons, & she had three triple expansion direct-acting engines of 300 N.H.P. & 1,200 I.H.P., by W Gray & Co, the builders of the ship.
The Penarth had four boats, two of which were life-boats, carried on either side of the engine-room skylight on chocks, & the other two were small boats carried on checks aft, & all properly fitted & found according to Board of Trade regulations. There were sufficient life-buoys ready for use, & life-belts for every man, stowed in the locker in the wheelhouse on the bridge. The Penarth had three compasses, a White & Thompson's standard on the bridge, by which the courses were set & the vessel navigated, & two spirit compasses by Messrs Berry & Co of Sunderland, placed before the steering gear, one in the wheelhouse amidships, the other on the poop aft, & they were adjusted in June last when the vessel was built, & swung in Hartlepool Bay. She appears to have been well found, fitted, & properly equipped for the voyage on which she was engaged.
At about 4 p.m. on Saturday, the 17th February, the Penarth left Odessa, on a voyage to Copenhagen with a cargo of grain, 1,400 tons of which was rye, & the remainder 3,090 tons barley, making 4,490 tons in all.
She had a crew of 25 hands , her mean draught of water being 21 ft., & she was under the command of Mr. Henry Holt, who held a certificate of competency numbered 93,266. The wind was N.N.W., blowing fresh & the weather clear. The Penarth proceeded on her voyage & sighted Serpent Island, steering S. by W. 1/4 W. A four-point bearing of the light was taken as they approached it, & at midnight the light bore W. by N. 1/4 N, & the distance was estimated by the four-point bearing to be 6 miles.
From this position the course, S. by W. 1/4 W. magnetic, was continued & the patent log set, & it was calculated that this S. 1/4 W. course, which would place her some 5 miles to the eastward of the Bosphorus Lightvessel, would allow for any set of current to the westward in the 230 miles distance between their position off Serpent Island & the Bosphorus Light-vessel.
On Sunday the 18th the wind & sea had increased, & there were sharp squalls of snow. Good sights were, however, obtained; & the position found by observation & distance run by patent log agreed exactly.
During the day the wind had increased to a fresh gale, the sea was rising, & the snow squalls more frequent, & the same course was continued as before.
At midnight the weather was so dark & thick at times with snow,  that they could hardly see 50 yards from the ship, but the vessel was still kept at full speed.
At 2 am, of the 19th the distance run by the patent log was 234 miles. The master then knew he was four miles southward of the light-vessel, & as nothing had been seen of the light or of the lights on shore, the weather being dark & thick with snow squalls, blowing a strong northerly gale & a high sea running, the vessel was very properly turned round & her head put to the N.N.W. & the engines slowed.
The vessel remained in this position until 3.15 a.m., when the weather clearing a little between the squalls, the vessel's head was once more put on the S. by W. 1/4 W. course, & the engines put full speed till 4.10 am, when they were slowed for ten minutes.
From 4.20 they again went on full speed until 4.40, & then slowed for 10 or 12 minutes, when the vessel struck & remained fast, having steered directly towards the shore (S. by W. 1/4 W.) from turning round at 3.15 am Directly she struck the sea commenced to break over her; the engines were put full speed astern, but with no effect, & the sea began driving the vessel over the sand-bank. The boats were then ordered to be got ready, & by daylight one of the lifeboats was got into the water on the lee-side of the vessel, the other lifeboat having in the meantime been stove in, & the two smaller boats broken up by the sea.
They could now see they were about 300 yards from the beach, which, together with the high land, some 300 or 400 yards from inshore of the breakers, was covered in snow.
Directly it was light enough to see, the chief mate (Mr. Thomas Cox) left the vessel in the lifeboat, intending, if possible, to find assistance from the shere, & then come back again for the remainder of the crew that were left on board. After a great deal of difficulty the lifeboat was safely beached some 400 yards from the wreck, but it took half-an-hour to accomplish this on account of the heavy sea breaking on the beach; & when they did get on shore the men were so benumbed with the intense cold & wet that they were physically unable to launch the boat again, & took shelter under a hut on shore. The hut was one used by the Black Sea Life Saving Service to store the rocket apparatus in, & eventually some men came down to the beach from the station, but the chief officer could get no one to attempt to go off to the wreck in the face of the sea.
On the arrival of the officer in charge of the lifesaving service, some 14 rockets were fired in the endeavour to throw a line over the wreck, but all failed to reach her, & a message was then sent away to the principal station near the entrance of the Bosphorus for the lifeboat. In the meantime the wreck had broken in two, the sea washing over her, & the master & the rest of the crew had taken refuge in the galley, which alone seemed to hold together. Here (after vainly endeavouring to float a line on shore from the vessel by means of an air tank, & then the gangway ladder) they remained all night, with the thermometer 15 degrees below zero, & expecting every sea would wash them away. However, the galley held together all night, & soon after daylight on the morning of the 20th they were all safely taken off the wreck & landed by the Black Sea Life-Saving Service lifeboat. The vessel having broken up, the crew were all finally sent to England by the British Consul, no lives being lost.
From the foregoing facts it is evident that this vessel was stranded & lost by the master deciding to turn the vessel round & steer full speed towards the shore at 3.15 am of the 19th, in the endeavour to pick up one of the lights leading into the Bosphorus.
At 3.15 the vessel, which had been heading to the northward, was in a position of perfect safety. She had overrun her distance from Serpent Island to the lightship off the entrance of the Bosphorus some four miles, & not seeing it or able to make out any other light at all, the weather being thick with snow & a strong northerly gale with a high sea, she was at 2 am very properly put round with her head to the wind & sea to wait till daylight, with the engines slowed down, & had this resolution been adhered to this wreck would in all probability have never been recorded.
But at 3.15 am the master, seeing that the weather was a little clearer between the squalls, decided to run closer in still, in the endeavour to pick up a light, & although he knew that at 2 a.m. the vessel was only 10 miles off the shore, he at 3.15 again turned her head towards the land & steamed full speed for an hour in thick weather, ignorant of his position & without using the lead, which (had it not been neglected) would at the last have warned him in time of his danger & saved the vessel.

At the conclusion of the evidence, Mr. Waldron, for the Board of Trade, submitted the following questions, & Mr. Ivor Vachell having addressed the Court on behalf of the master, the Court proceeded to give judgment:
1: What number of compasses had the vessel on board, where were they placed, & were they in good order & sufficient for the safe navigation of the ship?
2: When & by whom were they made, & when & by whom were they last adjusted?
3: Did the master ascertain the deviation of his compasses by observation from time to time. Were the errors of the compasses correctly ascertained, & the proper corrections to courses applied?
4: Whether proper measures were taken at or about midnight of the 17th February last, to ascertain & verify the position of the vessel?
5. Whether a safe & proper course was thereafter steered, & whether due & proper allowance was made for tides & currents?
6: Whether safe & proper alterations were made in the course at or about 2 am & 3.15 am of the 19th February, & whether due & proper allowance was made for tides & currents?
7: Whether, having regard to the state of the weather on the morning of the 19th February, the vessel was navigated at too great a rate of speed?
8: Whether the total neglect of the lead was justifiable?
9: Whether the vessel was navigated with proper & seamanlike care?
11: Whether the master & officers are, or either of them is, in default?
The following answers were given to the foregoing questions:
1 & 2: The "Penarth" had on board three compasses, viz., a standard compass, made by Messrs White & Thompson, Glasgow, which was placed on the bridge, & a steering compass in the wheel-house, & one aft on the poop, which were mad by Messrs Berry & Co., of West Hartlepool. They appear to have been in good order & were sufficient for the safe navigation of the ship. They were last adjusted in June 1893, by Berry, of West Hartlepool, when the ship was built.
3: There is no evidence as to whether the master ascertained by observation the deviation of his compasses, but when they were adjusted as above-mentioned the master was supplied with a deviation card which, he stated, he used, but it was not produced in Court.
4 & 5: About midnight of the 17th February a four-point bearing of Serpent Island was taken by the second mate, & the result reported to the master. It bore W. by N. 1/4 N., & was then calculated to be distant about six miles. The master was in his cabin when the bearing was reported to him, & he then ordered the patent log to be set, & the course of S. by W. 1/4 W. magnetic, which had been set at 10.30, to be continued. In setting this course the master allowed one degree for current, which he calculated would set him to the westward. The course was safe & proper, & the allowance for current was sufficient.
The four-point bearing of Serpent Island Light was a proper measure for ascertaining & verifying the position of the ship, but being a highly important point of departure the master ought to have been on deck during the whole of the time the bearing was being taken, so as to ensure the calculation of distance being made with the greatest possible precision.
6 to 11: The course of S. by W. 1/4 W. was continued with the engines going at full speed until about 2 am on the 19th. About 2 a.m the patent log was examined & showed that the ship had run 234 miles, & so had overrun her distance, in that she had passed, without its being seen, the lightship guiding to the entrance of the Bosphorus, from which it is about 15 miles distant. The ship was then turned round, & her head was put N.N.W., & was so kept until about 3.15 am with the engines at "slow."
The measures were adopted because the master stated he had an idea he had passed the lightship, & according to the second mate it was intended to keep her head to the northward until daylight. These measures were safe & proper, & if the latter course had been adhered to until daylight the ship would have escaped disaster.
At 3.15, however, the atmosphere, which had been very thick, cleared, & the master put the vessel back on her former course of S. by W. 1/4 W. & proceeded in that direction at full speed for about an hour. The master knew at 2 am he had overrun his distance, & he had failed to pick up the lightship he had expected to make on his starboard side, also at 3.15, although the atmosphere had become clearer, he was still unable to see the lightship, nevertheless he did not take a cast of the lead in order to ascertain or verify “as he might have done” the position of his ship. Moreover, whilst ignorant of his position he proceeded at full speed in the direction of the shore, seeing no lights, although, according to the distance run, he should have been within range of the lightship, the Kara Burnu, & the Bosphorus Lights. The inability to see the lightship or any other objects before the ship stranded, indicates a condition of the atmosphere that did not safely permit of navigating the vessel at full speed.
The lead, if used at any time between 3.30 am & 4.30am would have informed the master of his proximity to the shore, & he might then have averted. the disaster consequent on his previous error; but without using the lead “a neglect wholly unjustifiable he proceeded” with the exception of a period of about ten minutes, at full speed until about 4.40 am He then went slow for a period of about ten minutes, & then the vessel stranded on a ridge of sand about 13 miles to the east of the Kara Burnn Light.
The Court is of opinion that the alteration in the course at 3.15 was an improper measure, & the casualty was due to this alteration. The stranding might, however, have been averted if the master, as above mentioned, had not neglected the use of the lead. For the foregoing reasons the ship was not navigated after 3.15 a.m. on the 19th February with proper & seamanlike care, & the master alone is in default.
The Court attaches due weight to the master's high character, honourable career, & the severe sufferings he has endured since the casualty; but is nevertheless constrained to mark its sense of the master's negligence, which caused the loss of a valuable ship & imperilled many lives, by suspending his certificate for three months’.